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Is the Rust Belt's Revival Real?
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M. he Great Lakes region was battered
in the 1970s and early 1980s by a number
of structural and cyclical adjustments.
Heavy industry retrenched, manufactur-
ing jobs were slashed by the thousands,
and many factories were permanently
closed. So severe were the economic woes
felt here that the region became known
nationwide as the Rust Belt, an area seem-
ingly destined to suffer a continuing down-
ward spiral in relative employment levels
and living standards.
The region's recent economic showing
is clearly inconsistent with that nick-
name, however. The Great Lakes region
posted a significant turnaround from its
usual recessionary performance in
1990-91, as it was affected considerably
less than the nation at large in both the
magnitude and duration of employment
loss. In fact, compared with its historical
pattern in post-World War II contrac-
tions, the Midwest has performed
remarkably well in the past two years.
What caused this revival, and how per-
manent will it prove to be? While these
questions are obviously important for
Great Lakes workers and investors,
they unfortunately cannot be answered
with much precision. This Economic
Commentary explores the causes of the
turnaround and provides some insight
on their likelihood of persistence.
• The Great Lakes
in 1990-91: Only Half Bad
The Great Lakes region — Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin
— is an important part of the national
economy, accounting for nearly one-
fifth of the nation's employment and
output. One of the Census Bureau's
nine divisions of the United States, and
one of the Bureau of Economic Analysis'
eight regions, the Great Lakes area is
often described as the nation's industrial
heartland because it accounts for one-
fourth of U.S. durable-goods produc-
tion. Consequently, it has traditionally
been a particularly vulnerable region
when economic conditions begin to
deteriorate.
In all previous postwar recessions,
employment fell much more in the Great
Lakes than in the nation as a whole (see
figure 1). In the six downturns prior to
1990-91, the percentage decrease in
employment was roughly two to four
times as large in the Great Lakes as in
the United States. During the latest reces-
sion, however, the region's employment
loss was less than half as large as that
of the nation.
Similarly, the duration of employment
declines in previous recessions averaged
one or two calendar quarters longer in
the Great Lakes than in the nation, but in
1990-91, the slump appears to have been
one calendar quarter shorter in the Great
Lakes. Indeed, the latest downturn is
the only one of the seven examined
here that was briefer in this region than
in the nation.
• Industrial Mix and
Industry Performance
What accounts for this remarkable turn-
around in the relative performance of the
Great Lakes? Two influences appear to
be at work.
Welcome news during the past two
years of national economic hardship
was the improved relative performance
of the Great Lakes states, which posted
uncharacteristically mild levels and
duration of employment loss. But can
this improvement be sustained in
future downturns? Evidence on the
causes of the Rust Belt's turnaround
leaves little reason for confidence that
the region's relative performance will
be as good in the next recession as it
was in 1990-91.
Changes in the industrial mix of
region and recession. The industrial
mix of the Great Lakes has changed in
the past decade, so that the region is
now less dependent on sectors that are
usually more vulnerable to recessions,
and is more dependent on sectors that
tend to be less sensitive to recessions.
For example, between 1972 and 1989, the
share of total Great Lakes employment
held by durable-goods manufacturing fell
from 24 percent to 16 percent, while the
service sector's share rose from 15 per-
cent to 23 percent. Similar changes in
industry mix occurred nationally, but
were not nearly as pronounced.
By themselves, these factors would tend
to moderate the relative severity of reces-
sions in the Great Lakes, because a decline
in durable-goods manufacturing jobs
usually accounts for a large share of total
ISSN 0428-1276employment lost, while service-sector
employment often continues to expand.
In addition, the mix of industries affected
in 1990-91 is much different than in the
past, with overall positive consequences
for the Great Lakes. For example,
durable-goods manufacturing employ-
ment declined much less in this recession
than in 1974-75 (see figure 2), and
despite shrinking in relative importance
to the region since the early 1970s, this
industry is still more significant here
than in the nation. By the same token,
the finance, insurance, and real estate sec-
tor incurred greater employment losses
in this recession than in 1974-75, and is a
less-important employment source in the
Great Lakes than in the nation at large.
Moreover, although the service and
government sectors continued to expand
in this recession, they grew much less
than in 1974-75. Because those industries
are relatively less significant in the Great
Lakes, their sharply slower growth rates
represented less of a blow here than in
the nation.
Performance of specific industries local-
ly and nationally. For many reasons, the
performance of a specific industry can be
different regionally than nationally. For ex-
ample, during a recession, less-efficient
establishments in a manufacturing firm or
industry are likely to incur greater cut-
backs in sales and employment, so if local
firms and industries are more efficient
than their counterparts in the rest of the na-
tion, they would tend to fare better.
Differences in the final destinations of
an industry's products also affect the
degree to which its sales and employment
shrink during economic declines. If, for
example, the Great Lakes exports a much
larger share of its goods than does the na-
tion, then weak domestic demand coupled
with strong foreign demand would lead
to superior performance of the region's
industries. Moreover, industries such as
construction, services, transportation,
utilities, and trade sell most of their out-
put locally, making their performance
dependent primarily on local rather
than national conditions.
• Measuring the
Contribution of Each Cause
Measuring the impact of these two
causes of the Great Lakes' improve-
ment — changes in the industrial mix
of the region and the recession, and
differences between the national and
regional performances of specific indus-
tries —requires a basis for comparison.
Because the 1974-75 recession had an
employment decline closest to the aver-
age of the six downturns prior to 1990-
91,1 chose to compare these two periods
and to consider the changes that have
taken place in the industrial mix since
just prior to the earlier contraction.
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In the 1974—75 recession, the percent-
age decline in Great Lakes employment
was 1.7 times greater than the loss nation-
ally. Had the same ratio held in the
1990-91 downturn, Great Lakes employ-
ment would have fallen by 2.3 percent,
or 435,000 jobs. In fact, however, it
declined only 0.6 percent, or 122,000
jobs, from its peak in 1990:IIIQ to its
trough in 1991:IQ. What accounts for
this 313,000 shortfall in job loss?
A variation of shift-share analysis can
be used to quantify the contribution of
each cause of the difference. This tech-
nique shows that the changes in the in-
dustrial mix of the region account for
only about 13,000 jobs, or about 5 per-
cent of the difference, and changes in the
industrial mix of the recession account
for about 65,000 jobs, or about 20 per-
cent of the job-loss shortfall. In contrast,
improvements in the performance of
Great Lakes industries relative to their na-
tional counterparts—the market shares
effect—constitute a whopping 236,000,
or about 75 percent of the shortfall.
• Components of the
Market Shares Effect
If the market shares effect has fueled
most of the Great Lakes' revival, what
has made the difference possible? Its
largest components — construction,
manufacturing, and retail and wholesale
trade — together account for four-fifths
of this effect.
Construction is responsible for about 10
percent of the market shares effect. In the
earlier recession, construction employ-
ment fell slightly more in this region
than nationally, but in the 1990-91 epi-
sode, the decline was only about half as
great locally. Vacancy rates in 1990 for
residential rental and homeowner units,
office space, and industrial space were
generally much lower here. This suggests
that relatively less overbuilding occurred
in the Great Lakes than nationally during
the 1980s, and therefore there was less
need in the region to cut back on construc-
tion activity during the recent recession.
More than a third of the market shares
effect resulted from a relative improve-
ment in manufacturing. In 1974—75,
employment in this sector fell more in
the Great Lakes than nationally, 12.1
percent versus 10.1 percent, while in
1990-91 it shrank less, 3.2 percent versus
3.8 percent. One reason for this relative
upturn is that a larger share of Great
Lakes manufacturing employment is
export related, and nonagricultural
exports expanded rapidly in 1990-91,
but failed to grow at all in the 1974-75
recession. Thus, part of the region's
turnaround in manufacturing resulted
from developments abroad rather than
from internal changes. But the Great
Lakes also boosted its exports of manu-
factured goods by 28 percent in the latest
recession, versus only a 17 percent gain
for the United States. It is unclear
whether this difference resulted from
the mix of exports being demanded or
from an improvement in the relative ef-
ficiency of the region's export-goods
manufacturing.
Wholesale and retail trade also account
for more than a third of the market shares
effect. In 1974-75, percentage employ-
ment declines in trade were 2.7 times
greater in the Great Lakes than in the
nation, but in 1990-91 they were only one-
tenth as large. One possibility for this
great shift is that there was less need
for a shakeout in this industry regionally
than nationally. Industry specialists say
that excessive construction of retail
floor space nationwide during the 1980s
and increased financial leverage of re-
tail trade firms resulted in a major
industry downsizing over and above the
normal cyclical effect in 1990-91. TheFIGURE 1 SEVERITY OF RECESSIONS —
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better in other sectors, like construction
and manufacturing, than has the nation.
• How Permanent Is the Revival?
Some of the region's recent improvement
in relative stability is likely to carry over
into future recessions, but unfortunately,
much of it probably will not. Changes in
the mix of industries in the Great Lakes
that have made this region more like the
nation are likely to continue to be benefi-
cial, but those changes accounted for only
about 5 percent of the improvement in the
region's relative performance in 1990-91.
In contrast, the share of improvement at-
tributed to changes in the mix of reces-
sion, about 20 percent, cannot be con-
sidered permanent. Every recession is
different, and we have no basis for
predicting that the industrial mix of the
next recession will be similar to that of
the latest downturn.
Moreover, the market shares effect was
responsible for about 75 percent of the
revival. Construction, manufacturing,
and trade are the leading components
of this effect, and much of the advance
in those sectors cannot be expected to
continue.
The market shares effect in construction
appears to have resulted from greater
overbuilding nationally than in the
region. It would be unreasonable to ex-
pect the lenders who financed over-
building in the latest cycle to continue
this practice in future cycles, and for
that mistake to be made nationally but
not in the Great Lakes. Thus, it seems
likely that the portion of this effect at-
tributable to construction is unlikely to
recur in future recessions.
percentage growth of retail floor space
has been smaller in the Great Lakes
than nationally, but when scaled by
population growth, the buildups of
retail floor space and trade employment
were slightly larger here between 1974
and 1990. Thus, it is unlikely that the
Great Lakes' relative improvement in
trade employment loss can be attributed
to a smaller need for industry shakeout
here than in the nation at large.
Another possibility is that a downsizing
in Great Lakes retailing has merely
been forestalled because local condi-
tions have not yet been bad enough to
trigger it. Trade depends almost entirely
on local rather than national conditions,
and this region has been doing relatively
Part of the market shares effect in manu-
facturing seems to have resulted from
the strength of export demand during
the past two years—strength that was
not always present in past recessions
and that cannot be counted on with any
certainty to be felt in future contractions.
However, another portion of this effect
might have its origin in increased com-
petitiveness of the Great Lakes' export
manufacturing industry, which could lendsome permanence to the turnaround
in this sector.
Finally, the other major portion of the
market shares effect occurred in retail
and wholesale trade. This seems to have
been a spillover effect from the relative
strength in other sectors of the region,
rather than from some inherent strength
in Great Lakes retailing and wholesaling.
In fact, it could be that a major restruc-
turing in the region's trade sector is still
waiting to be triggered by a more severe
downturn in other sectors. Thus, the turn-
around in the trade sector might not
recur if demand for exports is weak in
the next recession and if construction
then is no healthier in the Great Lakes
than nationally.
favorable change in the industrial mix
of the recession cannot be assured in
the next episode. In addition, the
meager portion of improvement that
resulted from fewer excesses in construc-
tion seems rather unlikely to return.
Unfortunately, the bulk of the turn-
around appears to depend on foreign
demand for Great Lakes exports, which
cannot be forecast, and on some in-
crease in the relative efficiency of Great
Lakes manufacturing, which has not
been measured.
Thus, while the Great Lakes' dramati-
cally improved relative performance in
the latest recession was most welcome,
the region's workers and investors can-
not count on an equally dazzling encore.
3. The industries considered in this study
are mining; construction; durable-goods
manufacturing; nondurable-goods manufac-
turing; transportation, communication, and
public utilities; retail and wholesale trade;
finance, insurance, and real estate; services;
and government.
4. Results very similar to those reported here
were obtained when the 1990-91 recession
was compared against the 1981-82 recession.
5. For a description and illustration of tradi-
tional shift-share analysis, see Judith Z. Kal-
bacher, "Shift-Share Analysis: A Modified
Approach," Agricultural Economics Research,
January 1979, pp. 12-25. Traditional shift-
share analysis is typically used to explain the
growth that has occurred in a region during a
single period. My method instead explains
the difference between the performances of a
region in two periods. A description of this
method is available on request.
• Conclusion
The economy of the Great Lakes region
weathered the 1990-91 recession unex-
pectedly well, faring much better than
the nation and much better than its experi-
ence in the six prior recessions. The
region's employment loss was 313,000
jobs fewer than might have been antici-
pated based on its performance relative
to the nation in the 1974-75 recession.
The 5 percent share of the Great Lakes'
dramatic improvement in relative per-
formance stemming from an improved
industrial mix seems likely to recur in
the next downcycle; however, the 20
percent portion attributable to a
• Footnotes
1. The Census Bureau calls the five-state
area the East North Central Division.
2. I use nonfarm payroll employment in the
Great Lakes region and in the nation to iden-
tify peaks and troughs in the past seven reces-
sions. At the time of this writing, debate
continues as to whether the recession that
began in 1990 has indeed ended. Because
both Great Lakes and national employment
levels increased in the spring or summer of
1991, and because assignment of a later date
for the recession trough is unlikely to have a
significant effect on the results, the assumption
in this article is that the recession reached its
trough in the Great Lakes in the first quarter
of 1991, and in the nation in the second
quarter of 1991.
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